NOCTIVEX
SECURITY

External Security Posture Investigation

Technical investigation report

External exposure intelligence for security and business decisions

REPORT ID	NXS-ESP-SAMPLE-01
AUDIENCE	Security leadership, engineering and technical owners
METHOD	Passive and low-impact external observation
STATUS	Synthetic client-facing sample

SYNTHETIC SAMPLE / FORMAT DEMONSTRATION

All entities, evidence and findings are fictional. No real organization or customer was assessed.

READING GUIDE

Report navigation

The report separates decision content from technical substantiation. Leadership can use the summary and roadmap; technical owners can trace every priority to an observation, synthetic evidence excerpt and closure criterion.

Section	Decision supported	Reading path
Executive summary	What matters first and why	Leadership
Scope & methodology	What was and was not assessed	All readers
Attack surface map	Where exposure concentrates	Security / engineering
Findings	Evidence, impact and remediation	Technical owners
Roadmap	Who does what by when	Leadership / owners
Limitations	Residual uncertainty and next scope	Risk owner

Finding anatomy

01 OBSERVATION

The externally visible condition, stated without speculation.

02 EVIDENCE

A minimized, reproducible and synthetic-safe excerpt.

03 BUSINESS IMPACT

Why the condition matters in a plausible attack path.

04 REMEDIATION & VALIDATION

A named action plus objective evidence required to close it.

DECISION PAGE

Executive Summary

BOTTOM LINE

Overall external risk: HIGH

The synthetic environment has a manageable footprint, but weak email-domain enforcement and an exposed administrative surface make impersonation and credential-focused attacks more credible. The evidence does not show compromise.

2	1	1	3
HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	QUICK WINS

Priority decisions

- Approve staged DMARC enforcement after legitimate sender validation.
- Restrict administrative access and enforce phishing-resistant MFA.
- Fund a tested CSP rollout and reduce unnecessary version disclosure.

Findings summary

ID	Finding	Severity	Owner	Target
F-01	Email-domain policy is monitoring-only	HIGH	Messaging / DNS	0-7 days
F-02	Administrative endpoint is publicly discoverable	HIGH	Identity / App	0-14 days
F-03	Content-Security-Policy is not present	MEDIUM	Web engineering	15-30 days
F-04	Technology and metadata disclosure lowers attacker effort	LOW	Platform / Web	Within 30 days

ASSESSMENT BOUNDARIES

Scope & Methodology

AUTHORIZATION GATE

Written permission is mandatory

Work begins only after domain ownership or authorized control is confirmed. This synthetic sample assumes that gate has been satisfied.

Passive OSINT methods used

- DNS, certificate-transparency and public host discovery
- Email-authentication policy review
- Public TLS, HTTP header and metadata observation
- Low-impact service identification and manual analytical review

Out of scope

Included	Explicitly excluded
One authorized root domain and discovered public hosts	Authentication attempts or password attacks
Passive and low-impact external observation	Exploit validation or payload execution
Publicly retrievable evidence	Denial of service, social engineering or persistence
Prioritized remediation guidance	Compliance certification or legal opinion

EVIDENCE HANDLING

Minimized and reproducible

Only the observation needed to support a decision is retained. Secrets, credentials and unrelated personal data are excluded.

EXTERNAL EXPOSURE

Attack Surface Map

A compact view of the synthetic organization's public-facing systems, trust boundaries and security ownership.

PUBLIC DNS	WEB EDGE	IDENTITY	MAIL TRUST
Discoverable names	TLS and headers	Admin and SSO	SPF / DKIM / DMARC

Asset	Business role	Externally visible condition	Risk
example-saas.invalid	Primary web	CDN fronted; modern TLS; CSP absent	Medium
app.example-saas.invalid	Customer application	SSO entry point; no intrusive testing	Review
admin.example-saas.invalid	Administrative surface	Public DNS and reachable login	High
status.example-saas.invalid	Status communication	Third-party hosted	Low
mail.example-saas.invalid	Mail trust	SPF/DKIM present; DMARC monitoring-only	High

ATTACK-PATH INTERPRETATION

Exposure Narrative

ATTACK PATH 01

Brand impersonation to credential theft

Monitoring-only DMARC improves pretext credibility; the discoverable administrative surface gives the attacker a believable destination and identity context.

ATTACK PATH 02

Web injection impact without containment

A missing CSP does not prove a vulnerability, but it removes a browser-side control that can reduce impact if an injection defect exists.

Strong controls observed

- Modern TLS on the primary site
- Centralized public front door
- SPF and DKIM are present
- Narrow, manageable public footprint

RISK MODEL

Severity & Exploitability Matrix

Severity combines business impact, plausible exploitability, external visibility and compensating controls. It is directional and does not certify the environment as secure.

Rating	Decision meaning	Default response
HIGH	Credible attack path with material business impact	Named owner and near-term deadline
MEDIUM	Meaningful weakness requiring planned remediation	Schedule and validate within 30 days
LOW	Attacker-effort reduction or hygiene issue	Close during normal engineering cycle
INFO	Context useful for monitoring or future scope	Record, review and accept if appropriate

Combined classification

HIGH	7d	3	30d
OVERALL	FIRST SLA	OWNERS	ROADMAP

INTERPRETATION

Attack-path value outranks raw finding count

Low-severity metadata disclosure becomes more important when it supports a public administrative surface and weak brand-protection controls.

F-01
HIGH

Email-domain policy is monitoring-only

CATEGORY	PRIMARY OWNER	TARGET WINDOW
Email security	**Messaging / DNS**	**0-7 days**

OBSERVATION

What is externally visible

DMARC is present but publishes p=none. Failed alignment is reported, yet receiving systems are not instructed to quarantine or reject the message.

SYNTHETIC EVIDENCE

```
_dmarc.example-saas.invalid TXT  v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@example-saas.invalid
```

BUSINESS IMPACT

Why this matters

A credible spoofed sender can strengthen business-email-compromise pretexts, payment diversion attempts and credential-harvesting campaigns using the visible brand.

OWNED EXECUTION

Remediation Plan — F-01

Email-domain policy is monitoring-only

Step	Action	Owner	Timing
01	Inventory every legitimate sending service and verify SPF/DKIM alignment.	Messaging / DNS	0-7 days
02	Move to p=quarantine at a controlled percentage while monitoring exceptions.	Messaging / DNS	Sequenced
03	Promote to p=reject after legitimate senders are clean; retain aggregate reporting.	Messaging / DNS	Sequenced

Closure evidence

VALIDATION

What must be true before closure

Updated DNS record, approved sender inventory and aggregate reports showing no unknown legitimate sources.

Review checklist

- Evidence is attached to the finding record.
- The control is observable from the same external vantage point.
- A named owner accepts any residual risk.
- The next review date is recorded.

RESIDUAL RISK

Closure is not the same as zero risk

The action reduces this observed attack path. It does not certify the wider environment or replace separately scoped authenticated testing.

F-02
HIGH

Administrative endpoint is publicly discoverable

CATEGORY	PRIMARY OWNER	TARGET WINDOW
Identity exposure	Identity / App	0-14 days

OBSERVATION

What is externally visible

A recognizable administrative hostname is published in public DNS and its authentication page is reachable without an additional network or identity-aware gate.

SYNTHETIC EVIDENCE

```
admin.example-saas.invalid  A  203.0.113.24
HTTP/2 200  |  title: Administration Portal  |  identity provider disclosed
```

BUSINESS IMPACT

Why this matters

The surface attracts password spraying and targeted credential attacks, and it reveals useful identity-provider context even if the underlying software has no exploitable flaw.

OWNED EXECUTION

Remediation Plan — F-02

Administrative endpoint is publicly discoverable

Step	Action	Owner	Timing
01	Place the endpoint behind identity-aware proxying, VPN or an explicit allowlist.	Identity / App	0-14 days
02	Require phishing-resistant MFA for all privileged users.	Identity / App	Sequenced
03	Test alerts for failed sign-ins, impossible travel and new-device enrollment.	Identity / App	Sequenced

Closure evidence

VALIDATION

What must be true before closure

Access policy screenshot, MFA enforcement evidence and a documented alert test with named owner.

Review checklist

- Evidence is attached to the finding record.
- The control is observable from the same external vantage point.
- A named owner accepts any residual risk.
- The next review date is recorded.

RESIDUAL RISK

Closure is not the same as zero risk

The action reduces this observed attack path. It does not certify the wider environment or replace separately scoped authenticated testing.

F-03
MEDIUM

Content-Security-Policy is not present

CATEGORY	PRIMARY OWNER	TARGET WINDOW
Browser security	Web engineering	15-30 days

OBSERVATION

What is externally visible

The primary site returns modern transport and MIME-sniffing protections but does not return a Content-Security-Policy response header.

SYNTHETIC EVIDENCE

```
HTTP/2 200
strict-transport-security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
x-content-type-options: nosniff
content-security-policy: absent
```

BUSINESS IMPACT

Why this matters

CSP is not a substitute for secure coding, but a tested policy can reduce the impact of some browser-side injection paths. Its absence removes that containment layer.

OWNED EXECUTION

Remediation Plan — F-03

Content-Security-Policy is not present

Step	Action	Owner	Timing
01	Deploy a report-only policy and collect violation telemetry.	Web engineering	15-30 days
02	Remove unsafe-inline and unsafe-eval dependencies where practical.	Web engineering	Sequenced
03	Promote a tested policy to enforcement and monitor breakage.	Web engineering	Sequenced

Closure evidence

VALIDATION

What must be true before closure

Report-only telemetry reviewed, policy approved, regression tests passed and enforcement header visible externally.

Review checklist

- Evidence is attached to the finding record.
- The control is observable from the same external vantage point.
- A named owner accepts any residual risk.
- The next review date is recorded.

RESIDUAL RISK

Closure is not the same as zero risk

The action reduces this observed attack path. It does not certify the wider environment or replace separately scoped authenticated testing.

F-04
LOW

Technology and metadata disclosure lowers attacker effort

CATEGORY	PRIMARY OWNER	TARGET WINDOW
Reconnaissance	Platform / Web	Within 30 days

OBSERVATION

What is externally visible

Exact framework versions and public metadata reveal implementation details and internal route naming that are not required for normal users.

SYNTHETIC EVIDENCE

```
server: example-framework/4.8.2
x-powered-by: example-runtime
/source-map/app.bundle.js.map  200 OK
```

BUSINESS IMPACT

Why this matters

The information does not create compromise by itself, but it helps attackers prioritize version research and reduces the cost of mapping the application.

OWNED EXECUTION

Remediation Plan — F-04

Technology and metadata disclosure lowers attacker effort

Step	Action	Owner	Timing
01	Remove unnecessary server and framework banners.	Platform / Web	Within 30 days
02	Publish source maps only where operationally required and access-controlled.	Platform / Web	Sequenced
03	Review robots, manifests and public metadata during each release.	Platform / Web	Sequenced

Closure evidence

VALIDATION

What must be true before closure

Before/after header comparison and release evidence showing unnecessary public metadata is no longer available.

Review checklist

- Evidence is attached to the finding record.
- The control is observable from the same external vantage point.
- A named owner accepts any residual risk.
- The next review date is recorded.

RESIDUAL RISK

Closure is not the same as zero risk

The action reduces this observed attack path. It does not certify the wider environment or replace separately scoped authenticated testing.

EXECUTION PLAN

Remediation Roadmap

Window	Action	Owner	Completion evidence
0-7 days	Validate senders and stage DMARC enforcement	Messaging / DNS	Record, reports, approved sender list
0-14 days	Restrict administrative access; enforce strong MFA	Identity / App	Access policy and alert test
15-30 days	Test and enforce CSP	Web engineering	Telemetry, policy and regression result
Within 30 days	Reduce unnecessary metadata disclosure	Platform / Web	Before/after comparison
Quarterly	Repeat after material external change	Security owner	Closed findings and change log

Acceptance criteria

- Every high or medium action has a named owner and due date.
- Closure is based on evidence, not verbal confirmation.
- Residual risk is explicitly accepted when remediation is deferred.
- A follow-up check confirms externally visible behavior changed.

MANAGEMENT GATE

Track decisions, not activity

The engagement is complete when the report is delivered; the risk is reduced only when closure evidence confirms the control changed.

REPORT CLOSE

Limitations & Next Decision

This snapshot reflects an agreed time window and a public external vantage point. Dynamic hosting, rate limits, geo-routing and third-party systems can change what is observable.

This report is	This report is not
A fast prioritization product	A penetration test or exploit validation
A record of passive external observations	Proof of compromise or absence of compromise
Decision-ready remediation guidance	Compliance certification or legal opinion

Recommended next decision

AFTER F-01 AND F-02

Consider a separately scoped authenticated test

If the customer portal handles sensitive data or privileged workflows, authorize a distinct engagement with test accounts, rules of engagement and an agreed window.

Customer handoff

- Technical PDF and editable DOCX
- Separate executive leadership brief
- Technical finding register and action roadmap
- 30-minute review call and one clarification round

SYNTHETIC SAMPLE NOTICE

No real target was assessed

All domains, evidence and findings in this document are fictional and must not be represented as a real security opinion.

CONTACT

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